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ABSTRACT
Protecting intellectual property and controlling the use of their inventions is key to the strategy of many 
firms. At the same time, in order to be successful in open collaborative innovation, firms need to share 
their knowledge with others. This chapter presents, for moderate specialists, some strategic considerations 
with respect to managing intellectual property in open collaborative innovation. The chapter discusses 
how licensing strategies can be employed to balance various goals in collaborative efforts to innovate. 
In particular, licensing of intellectual property is presented as a way to manage protected knowledge 
that is developed and shared in collaborative innovation. Different elementary licensing schemes are 
presented. Open collaborative innovation can then consist of various “modules” of elementary licenses. 
The chapter finally proposes a few distinct strategies for governing knowledge exchange in collabora-
tive innovation, including open exchange and layered schemes, thereby outlining some conditions for 
successful open collaborative innovation.
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INTRODUCTION
Firms increasingly rely on external stakeholders 
to successfully innovate, as for example shown by 
the growing importance of inter-firm partnership 
and open innovation more generally (Dahlander 
& Gann, 2010; Hagedoorn, 2002). Building on 
the increasing importance of open innovation, 
as a means to use and recombine internal and 
external knowledge to develop and commercial-
ize valuable innovations (Chesbrough, 2003a), 
patent and know-how licensing and technology 
markets in general have become more important 
as a means to appropriate the benefits from in-
novation (Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001; 
Granstrand, 2000, 2004). As such, the question 
how to manage intellectual property (IP) is becom-
ing increasingly important as more firms develop 
their open innovation strategies (Alexy, Criscuolo, 
& Salter, 2009; Chesbrough, 2003b).
Within the context of open innovation, there is 
moreover increasing recognition of a “coupled” 
process of open innovation in which firms co-
create innovations with other stakeholders (e.g. 
through R&D collaborations) in which they need 
to cooperate and thus both obtain and share knowl-
edge (Bogers & West, 2010; Enkel, Gassmann, 
& Chesbrough, 2009). Such open collaborative 
innovation therefore challenges firms and their 
collaborators in terms of protecting their knowl-
edge and IP more generally.
As a central part of their open innovation strat-
egy, firms should thus manage their IP portfolio 
by extracting value from internal knowledge and 
intellectual property rights (IPRs), while also ac-
knowledging that protection at the same time may 
hamper innovativeness, adoption and diffusion.
To address the above issues, this chapter first 
provides an overview of the key elements related 
to the protection and control of knowledge, thereby 
also developing an overview of distinct licensing 
opportunities. Based on this, it subsequently pro-
poses a number of strategies as ways to govern 
knowledge exchange in open innovation. As such, 
this chapter provides a typology of basic licens-
ing schemes that can serve as building blocks for 
more complex licensing arrangements.
KNOWLEDGE PROTECTION AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
As open innovation in general and collaborative in-
novation in particular have increased in both extent 
and importance, protecting the knowledge that is 
being shared has become an increasingly important 
but also challenging issue for the innovating orga-
nizations. There are several trends that exemplify 
the growing importance of knowledge protection 
in general. For example, the growing importance 
of IP can be seen in the increasing number of pat-
ent applications (Granstrand, 2000; Grindley & 
Teece, 1997). That is, the rise of a “pro-IP era” or 
“pro-patent era” (Granstrand, 2000; Jaffe, 2000) 
has lead to an increasing propensity for firms to 
file patents (e.g. Grindley & Teece, 1997)—now 
often considered as being a firm’s “crown jewels” 
among its assets, especially in high-technology 
industries (e.g. Coriat & Orsi, 2002). As a result, 
this raises the importance of intellectual capital-
ism (IC) (see e.g. Gerlach, 1992; Teece, 2000) 
in general and IP/IC management in particular 
(Arora, et al., 2001; Chesbrough, 2003b).
However, the existing institutions of patent-
ing and IPRs at large have received an increasing 
amount of criticism in recent years (e.g. Boldrin & 
Levine, 2008; Coriat & Orsi, 2002; Dosi, Marengo, 
& Pasquali, 2006), thus also giving rise to new and 
often less protective strategies—not the least in the 
context of open innovation, e.g. in relationship to 
open source software (Henkel, 2006; Mazzoleni & 
Nelson, 1998; Shapiro, 2001; von Hippel & von 
Krogh, 2003). Moreover, there are indications that 
the transaction costs and societal costs of the patent 
system are increasing, which creates the need to 
reconsider the present patenting and licensing ap-
proaches (e.g. Davis, 2004; Jaffe & Lerner, 2004; 
Mazzoleni & Nelson, 1998). It has been argued that 
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the legal provisions in the current patent regime 
are to a large extent over-protective, which may 
result in a slowdown in innovation, for example 
in software technologies (Harison, 2004). It has 
furthermore been argued that “patent thickets”1 or 
“patent jungles” arise in some technologies and 
industries, creating an anti-commons, hold-ups, 
dead-locks and associated IP assembly problems, 
which in turn can have important anti-competitive 
(or anti-trust) implications and can hamper in-
novation and dynamic competition (Granstrand, 
2000, 2003; Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). Patents 
can then be licensed, cross-licensed, and pooled, 
in order to accommodate certain developments, 
e.g. in relation to certain standardization efforts 
in which IPRs and agreements like non-disclosure 
agreements (NDAs), joint venture agreements 
(JVAs) and licenses can then be used to set useful 
rules of the game in open collaborative innovation 
(Andersen, 2004).
To spur open collaborative innovation, the 
effectiveness of the design of the IPR system de-
pends on the ease (e.g. low transaction costs) with 
which right holders can enter into licensing and 
other contractual arrangements involving these 
rights (Gallini & Scotchmer, 2002) and its func-
tionality as a contractual infrastructure for market 
signaling and governance. Furthermore, licensing 
has become of growing importance, partly due 
to the rise of patenting propensity and strategic 
patenting, using various patent strategies (fences, 
thickets, blankets, evergreening, multi-protection, 
etc). This requires firms to increasingly acquire 
multiple licenses to avoid risks of litigation when 
they commercialize an innovation (Granstrand, 
2000, 2004; Hertzfeld, Link, & Vonortas, 2001; 
Shapiro, 2001).
With these trends as background, the next 
section discusses the properties of knowledge in 
general and technical knowledge (i.e. technology) 
in particular, as well as the rationale for knowledge 
and technology protection in inter-organizational 
collaborative innovation. It subsequently describes 
proprietary knowledge as a form of IP and gives 
an overview of different IP strategies in general 
and for open collaborative innovation in particular. 
It concludes by providing an overview of various 
licensing schemes and strategies, as a particular 
way to share protected knowledge in open col-
laborative innovation.
PROPERTIES OF KNOWLEDGE 
AND TECHNOLOGY
When considering how to protect knowledge—in 
particular technical knowledge (i.e. technology)—
in open collaborative innovation, a useful point 
of departure is an exposition of some elementary 
properties of knowledge and technology.
In principle, knowledge can be considered 
as a partly public good, as noted by e.g. Arrow 
(1962) and others, with two main properties being 
that it is (a) non-rivalrous in consumption and (b) 
non-excludable. As a public good, knowledge has 
high fixed costs in production and low costs in 
distribution. The production and distribution of 
knowledge, in its pure form, is moreover cumu-
lative and interactive, while it is also impossible 
to reverse the process of knowledge transfer 
(dispossession is impossible). However, in real-
ity, the public good nature of knowledge is not 
purely valid due to the possibility to appropriate 
knowledge.
Moreover, the protection of knowledge—in 
particular technical knowledge—is contingent 
on the embodiment of the knowledge, as this de-
termines how it can be transferred and protected. 
For example, there are limits to the ability to 
identify and transfer tacit (as opposed to explicit 
or codified) knowledge (Cowan, David, & Foray, 
2000; Polanyi, 1958, 1967). Tacit knowledge is 
difficult to articulate and valuate, making it more 
difficult to transfer it economically (Teece, 2000). 
For example, open collaborative innovation usu-
ally requires joint, face-to-face communication 
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to transfer knowledge properly, which can be a 
slow and costly process (Afuah, 2003; Conner & 
Prahalad, 1996; Monteverde, 1995; von Hippel, 
1994).
In the context of open collaborative innovation, 
however, knowledge (and technical knowledge in 
particular) can often be more easily transferred 
due to its embodiment in technologies and IPRs, 
although other costs need to be considered. Fol-
lowing Granstrand (1998), technical knowledge 
(i.e. technology) has specific properties. These 
technology properties—codifiability, cumula-
tiveness, combinatorial and patentability—give 
growth potential as well as transfer, spillover 
and trade possibilities for technology but general 
knowledge properties—especially dispossession 
impossibility and observation impossibility for 
human embedded knowledge—create moral haz-
ard, which creates knowledge market failures at 
the same time, as in Arrow’s (1962) information 
paradox. This implies a need from both buyer and 
seller side for long-term contractual governance 
on the technology market, resulting in license 
type of contracts, be they patent or know-how 
licenses. This is fundamentally different from a 
spot market transaction with the physical transfer 
of a traded item with exhaustion of rights. Given 
the constraints of knowledge trade (as different 
from physical trade), together with supply and 
demand for new technologies, open collaborative 
innovation becomes more conducive (or even 
necessary) as a quasi-integrated organizational 
form—intermediate between markets and manage-
ment governance—as a driver of technological in-
novation at firm level (see also Granstrand, 2004).
A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Intellectual Property 
Rights and Licensing
IP may be considered as a form of property like 
“real” physical property, such as land or machinery, 
although the degree to which this is true has been 
part of a long-time discourse on the nature and 
legitimation of IPRs (see Machlup & Penrose, 
1950, for a good overview). Moreover, it could be 
noted that historically an IPR like a patent right 
has not been viewed as “property” but rather as 
a privilege on concession. IP can be subjected to 
possession and control by agents and could thereby 
be viewed as property, although first and sole pos-
session, being basic criteria for granting physical 
property rights, are difficult to establish for IP.
IP can be distinguished from physical property 
due to its intangibility. As such, it can be con-
sidered as a distinct form of intellectual capital. 
Real property has physical features making it a 
tangible good whereas the main characteristic of 
IP is its intangible nature.
The main characteristic of intellectual prop-
erty (and physical property alike) is that it can be 
bought, sold, given away, leased and exchanged, 
although there are limits to do this. In essence, 
the owner of the property can prevent others from 
using the property and possibly transacting it in 
the ways described above by a legal framework.
According to the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization (WIPO, 2001), IPRs refer to 
the legal rights which result from intellectual 
activity in the industrial, scientific, literary and 
artistic fields. Every country has its own laws 
to protect IP, although a process of international 
harmonization is ongoing. Generally, IP law aims 
at safeguarding creators and other producers of 
intellectual goods and services by granting them 
certain rights (for a limited amount of time) to 
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control the use of their knowledge. Those rights 
do not apply to the physical object in which the 
creation may be embodied but instead to the 
intellectual creation as such. WIPO (2001) distin-
guishes two branches of IPRs, namely “industrial 
property” and “copyright”. The latter refers to 
literary, artistic and scientific works, while IPRs 
relates to industrial property, including industrial 
designs, trademarks, geographical indication, 
trade secrets, and patents.2 In the context of open 
collaborative innovation, trade secrets and patents 
are most relevant, while they are also generally 
the most commonly used method of protecting 
IP (see e.g. Hertzfeld, et al., 2001). Moreover, in 
the context of open source software, copyright (or 
“copyleft”) plays a particularly important role (de 
Laat, 2005; Lerner & Tirole, 2002b; von Hippel 
& von Krogh, 2003). Several considerations that 
relate to obtaining certain IPRs, such as patents, 
include the likelihood of patent protection, the 
life cycle of the technology, the relation to other 
IPRs, risk of losing the protection, the cost of 
obtaining, maintaining and enforcing the protec-
tion, the technology readiness, and the licensing 
possibilities (Lee & Davidson, 1993).
Because of the importance of patents in general 
and in open collaborative innovation in particular, 
understanding the main strategies to exploit patents 
is of interest within the context of collaborative 
innovation and open innovation more generally. 
Once an organization (or individual) is granted a 
patent, it basically needs to make some strategic 
choices.
The first one is whether to allow others to use 
the patented technology. If the company decides 
to do so, it can sell its patent altogether (e.g. if 
it does not want to be liable for litigation or lost 
interest in owning it). Alternatively, it could opt 
to license its patent out, in order to raise licensing 
revenue, or to gain access to other party’s intel-
lectual property via cross-licenses. Well-known 
examples of licensed technologies are Xerox’ 
Ethernet technology and JVC’s VHS technology. 
It could be noted that any type of IPR could be 
licensed, such as in high-tech industries, software 
and science, but in the music industry as well. 
Below, we will discuss licensing strategies in 
greater detail.
If a company decides it does not want others to 
use the patented technology, it still has to decide 
whether or not it actually wants to implement 
the patented technology itself in its products or 
processes. Philips’ use of its shaving technology 
patents is an example in which it uses its patents 
to enjoy a monopoly on some specific technolo-
gies, offering Philips a particular competitive 
advantage. But also not implementing the patented 
technology is not an unusual strategy. Firms may 
want to have a patent to block the development of 
a rivaling technology of a competitor or to keep 
the option to enter a market at a later stage.
Licensing Types: Building 
Blocks for IP Strategies
Given the important role played by patents as well 
as technology and IP more generally, licensing 
strategies are central to understanding the pos-
sible constraints to knowledge transfer in open 
collaborative innovation. Licensing is a transfer of 
rights from a licensor (seller), typically the owner 
of an IPR, to a licensee (buyer). For the former it 
is a means to exploit its IP while at the same time 
controlling its use or diffusion. The latter can use 
the IP without having to fear it is infringing the 
underlying IPR (e.g. patent). The licensor can 
license out all or just some of the rights and will 
consider which restrictions to use.
Two of the main considerations in relation to 
licensing are exclusivity and whether the licensee 
has the right to sublicense. Licenses might more-
over apply to different types of knowledge, with an 
important consideration being whether the knowl-
edge is developed before, during, besides and 
after the collaboration (cf. European Commission, 
2001, 2002). Accordingly, Table 1 distinguishes 
between background, foreground, sideground and 
postground knowledge (Bogers, 2011).
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Below follow some of the different consider-
ations regarding licensing and some different 
(general) licensing forms will be discussed. Most 
of the licensing types presented below should be 
considered as essentially being “modules” of 
(elementary) licenses, which can in turn be used 
as building blocks to be combined to form more 
complex licensing “architectures” as one could 
expect in open collaborative innovation.3 See 
Figure 1 for an overview of different types of 
licenses (see also Granstrand, 2011).
In order to benefit from licensing—thus going 
beyond the base case in which the owner of the 
IPR keeps the rights (i.e. self-license)—the licen-
sor may demand a compensation from the li-
censee, as in an exclusive, sole or simple (non-
exclusive) license as basic licensing types (Figure 
1). In the more ordinary, traditional way of licens-
ing, the payment of royalties can be seen as a 
good means of compensation. The concept of 
royalty means that the licensee pays a fee to use 
the licensor’s knowledge under the conditions 
stated in the licensing agreement. Different kinds 
of monetary royalties that can be distinguished 
are, for example, lump sum payment, fixed pay-
ment per sold product, fixed fee per year, percent-
age of sales price or revenues, or a gradual payment 
that changes per sales volume.
An important consideration in relation to li-
censing is the exclusivity of the right. On the one 
hand, a licensor can grant an exclusive license by 
licensing to only one licensee and, on the other 
hand, it can grant a license to several licensees. 
Whichever option is considered, it has important 
implications for the negotiations and expected 
compensation. Some possible restrictions are: 
no right to sub-licensing or reselling (see below), 
geographical area, field of application, or a spe-
cific mode of commercialization (see e.g. Bessy 
& Brousseau, 1998). In addition, an exclusive 
right for a limited period of time could be granted.
Alternatively, the licensor may demand to be 
compensated in other non-monetary ways, such as 
access to the licensee’s technology. With particular 
reference to open collaborative innovation, if two 
parties are interested in each other’s knowledge 
and both of them have an IPRs portfolio of interest 
to each other, they could agree on a cross-license 
arrangement (Figure 1). In this agreement, the 
parties go into a mutual agreement granting 
each other (a package or bundle of) licenses. 
Essentially, the firms license each other with the 
compensation being a license, or a package of 
licenses. Although cross-licensing principally 
can involve the exchange of the right to one 
technology from each firm, the firms most typi-
cally cross-license each other a bundle of rights. 
In general, the rationale for cross-licensing is to 
increase simplicity and decrease transaction costs. 
Moreover, cross-licensing can create a framework 
in which firms can access each other knowledge 
and thereby (collaboratively) create new knowl-
edge or networks. The knowledge subject to the 
cross-licensing scheme can be either related or 
unrelated, which influences the exact terms. The 
(a)symmetry of the firms’ packages affect the 
exact terms as well and potentially creates the 
need for additional compensation (of one party).
Another important strategic consideration is 
whether the licensee is allowed to sub-license, 
meaning that the licensee itself is allowed to grant 
licenses (to the licensed technology) to third parties 
Table 1. Types of knowledge open collaborative 
innovation (Bogers, 2011) 
Type of 
knowledge
Description
Background 
knowledge
Existing knowledge put into the collabora-
tion
Foreground 
knowledge
Knowledge created as an outcome of the 
collaboration
Sideground 
knowledge
Knowledge relevant to the collaboration 
developed in-house in parallel to the col-
laboration
Postground 
knowledge
Knowledge relevant to the collaboration 
developed in-house by the firm after the 
collaboration (formally) finished
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(Figure 1). The decision to allow sub-licensing 
depends on what the licensor wants to achieve 
by licensing the knowledge. For example, if the 
owner of an IPR is not able to fully exploit a tech-
nology, it can for this reason grant an (exclusive) 
license to a licensee that will commercialize the 
technology. In order for the licensee to be able to 
appropriately exploit the technology, sub-licensing 
could then be part of the agreement (Megantz, 
1996). This strategic decision can give the main 
licensor the ability to profit from its technology 
when it does not have the resources to internally 
Figure 1. Types of licenses in open collaborative innovation (Granstrand, 2011)
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commercialization the technology (cf. Enkel, et al., 
2009; Lichtenthaler, 2005; Lichtenthaler & Ernst, 
2007; van de Vrande, de Jong, Vanhaverbeke, & 
de Rochemont, 2008). As such, sub-licensing 
may optimize the overall revenues from a patent. 
However, if a patent owner is seeking to control the 
use of its technology, it will avoid sub-licensing.
Moreover, in a blanket license, a licensor 
licenses out all rights related to the (currently 
unknown) future developments in a certain area. 
Thus, if future developments that fulfill certain 
criteria lead to new patents and know-how, the 
rights to use these are automatically granted within 
the blanket license agreement—in contrast to “off 
the shelf” licensing of existing technologies and 
licensing on order (or not) of future new technolo-
gies. Blanket licensing might apply to research 
joint ventures or alliances in which a party is 
licensing out its future foreground technology, 
while it is also embedded in some open source 
software agreements in which some people agree 
to share with some people all they come up with, 
before it is known or even specified or asked for.
An owner of IPRs can also consider packag-
ing (block/package license) the rights to several 
technologies as a package (Figure 1). In this case, 
the licensee has to buy the full package of licenses 
in order to access one or more of the individual 
rights. Packaging can lower transaction costs 
if several licenses are required to use a certain 
technology. It can also be a means for a licensor 
to create additional revenues or an attempt to 
influence a certain technological development.
A final possible elementary licensing type is 
a grant-back license (also sometimes referred 
to as “technology flowback”), which gives the 
licensor the right to use (any) possible future tech-
nological improvements that the licensee makes 
to the originally licensed technology, usually in 
combination with a compensation of some sort 
(Figure 1). Thus, once the licensee develops a 
related technology (e.g. patent), a license to the 
improved technology will go back to the original 
licensor. The right for the licensee is only related 
to a specific, defined technology, and the license 
that is being granted back is related to improve-
ments of that same specific, defined technology. 
Furthermore, the two firms can decide to more 
specifically define the scope of the grant-back 
license. Some possible distinctions are granting 
back the property rights on the development, or 
just the user rights, or alternatively they could 
agree on just a simple information right (Bessy 
& Brousseau, 1998).
Collaboration Types: 
Implementing IP Strategies in 
Open Collaborative Innovation
In order to adopt the right licensing strategy, a 
firm has to consider how it can best appropriate 
the returns form its knowledge and technology, 
or IP at large. While highly codified knowledge, 
such as a patent, may be effectively licensed, 
especially if it is not context-specific (Kogut & 
Zander, 1993; Williamson, 1991), licensing is 
not always reported as the most important appro-
priation mode (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000). 
For knowledge purely embedded in technology, 
licensing could be used if it appropriates suf-
ficient returns (Teece, 1998). Which strategy is 
the best will also depend on the sector in which 
a firm is active. The importance and efficiency 
of technology and patents differ across sectors 
and therefore also the optimal use and benefit 
from licensing. For example, patents are a more 
efficient mechanisms to protect and appropriate 
benefits from knowledge in the chemical industry 
(e.g. Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, & Winter, 1987). 
In the electronics industry, where interoperability 
is important and where standards provide such in-
teroperability, cross-licensing and non-exclusive, 
“open” licensing programs are key. Without broad 
access to these IPRs, the standard can simply not 
reach the necessary critical mass.
Licensing strategies have changed as well in 
the context of open innovation. There are many 
examples of firms opening their boundaries in 
45
Intellectual Property and Licensing Strategies in Open Collaborative Innovation
order to strengthen their IP portfolio (see e.g. 
Arora, et al., 2001; Chesbrough, 2003a). The 
presence of an open innovation paradigm is 
moreover related to the growing prevalence of 
collaborative innovation, with particular reference 
to concepts as packaging and cross-licensing. In 
open source software, less restrictive licensing 
strategies can moreover be identified. This kind of 
model essentially entails the use of non-exclusive, 
royalty-free licenses with a grant-back provision. 
Dependent on the exact design, a form of (lo-
cal) cross-licensing may moreover be adopted. 
A specific example of how the above licensing 
types can be combines into a (more complex) 
licensing scheme is “copyleft”, which entails a 
non-exclusive blanket license with a compulsory 
non-exclusive grant-back blanket license.
Figure 1 offers two specific examples of more 
complex licensing arrangements as illustrations 
of how elementary licensing types can be used 
as building blocks to represent particular types 
of collaborative innovation. The first illustration 
shows a bilateral cross-licensing of background 
knowledge and co-owned foreground knowledge. 
This example reflects a typical type of alliance in 
which two firms enter a collaboration in which 
they share their background knowledge as well as 
the foreground developed within the collaboration. 
However, as also shown in the figure, the respec-
tive firms keep the rights to their sideground as 
well as postground knowledge. Thus, while the 
firms openly share knowledge within the narrow 
scope of the collaboration, they are more restrictive 
(i.e. less open) when it comes to parallel in-house 
developments and developments after the collabo-
ration has ended. It could be noted however that 
in practice it can be difficult to identify or prove 
where the boundary lies between these different 
types of knowledge, in particular background and 
sideground knowledge.
The second illustration of a type of open 
collaborative innovation in Figure 1 is a case of 
what can be called joint licensing, which takes 
the form of a patent pool in the case of patents. 
This strategy can be relevant if there are several 
different holders of complementary patents (or 
IPRs in general) that are all needed for a certain 
development. Essentially, joint licensing can take 
two forms—licensing via mutual coordination 
or via a third party administrator. Typically, joint 
licensing involves more than two firms and the 
licensors can also be the licensees of other licen-
sors’ technology. A patent pool in particular can 
be described as an agreement between two or 
more parties to cross-license parts of their cur-
rent or future patent portfolios related to certain 
technologies to one another (or to third parties). 
The example in Figure 1 thus shows a three-party 
patent pool in which all knowledge except side-
ground knowledge is shared by all parties.
Summarizing, some of the main strategic con-
siderations in relation to licensing are exclusivity, 
sub-licensing, cross-licensing, market and territo-
rial (and other) restrictions, future developments, 
technical assistance, royalties, restraint of trade, 
and taxes. In the context of open collaborative 
innovation, one could effectively distinguish 
between background, foreground, sideground 
and postground knowledge as a way to separate 
knowledge that is respectively developed before, 
during, besides and after the collaboration (cf. 
Bogers, 2011). This distinction can namely help to 
separate the types of knowledge that can or should 
be covered by specific types of licenses. Within a 
collaborative innovation project, the characteris-
tics of the innovation project moreover determine 
which licensing strategy can and should be ad-
opted. For example, licensing from universities 
is significantly different from industrial licensing 
(Megantz, 1996). In general, universities take a 
very open or at least publishing-oriented strategy 
(cf. open science), although changes in this occur 
as well, for example due to the implementation of 
the Bayh-Dole Act, which encourages universities 
to apply for patents on the research results, while 
earlier the norm was to place such results in the 
public domain (Eisenberg, 1996; Mazzoleni & 
Nelson, 1998). Given the increasing involvement 
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of universities in open collaborative innovation, 
such an issue can have important implications 
for how the protection of knowledge has to be 
arranged.
GOVERNANCE AND LICENSING 
STRATEGIES IN OPEN 
COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION
This section develops a number of general strate-
gies for governing the exchange of knowledge (as 
a particular type of IP) in open collaborative inno-
vation—thereby feeding into the understanding of 
open innovation more generally (cf. Chesbrough, 
2003b; West, 2003). In particular, based on the 
assumption that every knowledge transfer is cov-
ered by some sort of formal or informal contract, 
it gives an overview of the governance of effective 
knowledge exchange (cf. Mohr & Sengupta, 2002) 
and the role of licensing (based on the previous 
section). There is also a particular interest in “open 
source” as a model of governance and licensing. 
The alternatives of an open knowledge exchange 
and a layered collaboration scheme are also dis-
cussed. Finally, this section proposes a number of 
distinct knowledge exchange strategies. Based on 
a differentiation of knowledge sharing and protec-
tion mechanisms, these strategies offer concrete 
propositions and boundary conditions for when 
a particular strategy might be more appropriate 
than another one, thereby further advancing the 
practice of collaborative innovation as well as the 
research into open innovation at large (cf. Enkel, 
et al., 2009; West, Vanhaverbeke, & Chesbrough, 
2006).
Governance
Scholars have long identified that collaborations 
of various sorts set up governance structure to 
deal with the exchange of knowledge (see e.g. 
Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000; Mohr & Sen-
gupta, 2002). These governance structures to a 
large extent aim at reaching a satisfying level 
of knowledge sharing while at the same time 
providing an appropriate level of protection of 
the knowledge. The traditional way to govern 
knowledge exchange in open collaborative in-
novation is by using agreements that state what 
should be shared, to which extent and how it is 
protected—also with respect to which type of 
knowledge (i.e. background, foreground, side-
ground and postground knowledge). Choosing 
an appropriate governance mechanism is thus a 
way to manage knowledge exchange within open 
collaborative innovation.
Kale et al. (2000) moreover argue that build-
ing a good relationship (“relational capital”) in 
collaborations facilitates learning through close 
one-to-one interaction while it at the same time 
minimizes the likelihood of opportunistic be-
havior (i.e. unilateral absorption or stealing of 
proprietary knowledge). Moreover, Oxley and 
Sampson (2004) argue that limiting the scope of 
the collaboration is a way to manage knowledge 
exchange. In that case, the amount or degree of 
knowledge sharing is limited in order to decrease 
the potential conflict sharing this knowledge. 
This especially applies to the case in which the 
protection of knowledge is a delicate issue, which 
is often the case when competitors collaborate.
Licensing
Licensing, as also described above, plays an 
important role in the governance of knowledge 
transactions and thereby in collaborative and open 
innovation in general. Accordingly, licensing can 
be the way to manage knowledge transfer in open 
collaborative innovation, for example when there 
might be conflicting interests. A license is namely 
by definition an agreement that states the terms 
of how a piece of knowledge is protected (and 
partly how it is appropriated) when it is trans-
ferred from the licensor to the licensee. There is 
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a variety of different types of elementary licenses, 
each providing particular permissions, which can 
in turn be combined to form more complex and 
more encompassing sets of licenses (see Figure 1).
In the context of open collaborative innovation, 
it will typically not be economical to specify (i.e. 
write a license for) every transfer of knowledge. 
Instead, in order to decrease transaction costs, 
more general agreements are used that deal with 
several licensing issues at once. One example of 
this is a cross-licensing agreement in which the 
partners license each other the knowledge needed 
for the collaboration. Alternatively, a less explicit 
“umbrella agreement” is used, which states that 
knowledge should and will be shared to the extent 
needed and the partners will only use this in rela-
tion to the collaboration and will not internalize 
it privately. Still, certain terms, such as exclusiv-
ity and compensation (in case of asymmetric 
knowledge exchange), can be agreed upon. These 
general agreements are more risky in the sense of 
unwanted appropriation and are therefore based on 
trust between the partners to a large extent. This 
latter strategy might be a fruitful one and perhaps 
even necessary to be able to reach the goal of col-
laborative innovation projects, particularly in the 
face of the increasing pace of innovation as well 
the increasing complexity and diversity of R&D. 
In relation to this, it might be required to adopt 
some kind of grant-back strategy as well, with or 
without exclusivity and/or sub-licensing rights.
There is an increasing amount of interest in 
the informal exchange nature of what might be 
called the open source movement, in particular 
open source software or open science. Such ex-
amples of open collaborative innovation (which 
however do not necessarily involve firms) often 
entail informal or implicit contracting/licensing 
(e.g. copyleft). Such arrangements are effective 
under certain conditions, for example when there 
is recurrent contracting and when collaborators 
are in some way socialized in that collaborators 
can be excluded if they deviate from the norm.
Open Knowledge Exchange
As explained above, licensing can entail more or 
less restrictive arrangements by either discourag-
ing or promoting the dissipation and use of knowl-
edge. For example, in software development, the 
GNU General Public License (GPL) is used to 
more freely or openly distribute knowledge (or 
development result), although the possibility of 
appropriation of the results still exists in some way. 
As such, the GPL intends to guarantee one’s free-
dom to share and change free software by obliging 
the transfer of the source code and all the right 
to use and modify the software (the source code 
in particular). Copyleft, as referred to before, can 
moreover be interpreted as a non-exclusive blanket 
license with a compulsory non-exclusive grant-
back blanket license (i.e. with sub-licensing). 
Thus, even an open knowledge exchange strategy 
can be described as a combination (architecture) 
of a number of essential license types (modules), 
as also presented in Figure 1.
Broadly speaking, open source models entail 
several distinct types of licensing schemes. In 
general, open source software can be considered as 
an incentive system for innovations, which takes 
a different approach than for example the patent 
system (Lerner & Tirole, 2002a). Important to note 
is that open source is especially relevant for public 
good knowledge. Accordingly, von Hippel and 
von Krogh (2003) propose a “private-collective 
innovation model” that contains elements of both 
the private investment model (in which knowledge 
is appropriated privately) and the collective action 
model (with the emphasis on public knowledge), 
and can offer society the “best of both worlds”. 
This model, in which privately developed results 
(e.g. a code in open source software) are freely 
revealed, might have similarities with the strate-
gies adopted in collaborative innovation in general 
(Harhoff, Henkel, & von Hippel, 2003; Raasch, 
Herstatt, & Balka, 2009; von Hippel, 2007). On 
the one hand, “free” dissemination of knowledge 
to the public can be applicable to some cases, 
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such as in the case of standardization projects. 
On the other hand, collaborating partners might 
implement an open knowledge exchange strategy 
with some partners but not with others.
Layered Collaboration Scheme
With an increasing number of participants involved 
in open collaborative innovation, it becomes more 
difficult to manage the exchange of knowledge. 
Therefore, it is generally acknowledged that one 
should aim at keeping the number of partners 
to a minimum. At the same time, it is clear that 
certain developments need the input of more (or 
even many) partners. If a collaborative innovation 
project consists of many partners, the work can 
be divided among the partners and over time. In 
this sense, certain “sub-collaborations” can arise 
within the overall collaborative innovation project. 
Furthermore, if some of the partners play a more 
central role than others, a layered collaboration 
scheme can take a more structural form with 
relatively fixed core members and outer member. 
Relatedly, there might be a “hub” organization in 
which one partner (i.e. the hub) takes a central 
role in the negotiation of agreements (European 
Commission, 2002). This is especially the case 
in international collaborations in which different 
national systems complicate the generic collabora-
tion agreement. This can moreover be an effec-
tive way to deal with IPRs and licensing issues 
because these are not well covered by general 
agreements (e.g. the model consortium agreement 
of the “European Framework Programmes”) that 
generally over-specify the terms (European Com-
mission, 2002).
Effectively, a layered collaboration scheme 
entails a multi-partner collaborative innovation 
project in which the “core” consists of inner 
members that generally have a close relationship 
and adopt a strategy of open knowledge exchange, 
while the “periphery” consists of the outer mem-
bers that adopt a specific knowledge exchange 
strategy among each other. More particularly, the 
inner members potentially adopt a specific and 
potentially different knowledge exchange strategy 
towards the outer members. Additionally, there 
needs to be particular arrangements for knowledge 
exchange with “non-members” in the market or 
general environment (as in the case of non-layered 
forms of open collaborative innovation). One ex-
ample of a layered collaborative innovation project 
is the Bluetooth standardization consortium in 
which there are a few core members4 that set up 
the consortium and openly shared their knowledge 
to develop the Bluetooth standard. The periphery 
of this collaboration consists of many partners 
that adopt the developments of the core in a strict 
way, which is also a way for the core members 
to appropriate the results of the developments.
An important economic rationale for the exis-
tence of a layered collaboration scheme is dealing 
with the different roles that different partners have 
in a multi-partner collaborative innovation project 
in order to reach the common goal. Although it is 
essential to pool resources of all the partners to a 
certain extent, there is an asymmetry of contribu-
tions between the different partners. This means 
that a different exchange strategy is required for 
inner and outer members. In this sense, establishing 
an open knowledge sharing in the inner structure 
can economize on transaction costs because there 
are few costly contracts involved. The contribu-
tions of the core members relate to the core of 
the development in the collaborative innovation 
project and their open sharing therefore has to be 
compensated with a high degree of appropriation 
of the returns on this development. The open 
sharing in the core of the collaboration moreover 
deals with the “information paradox” (as does 
open sharing in general) in a more defined way, 
which is a way govern knowledge exchange in 
the collaboration.
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Knowledge Exchange Strategies
In order to govern knowledge exchange in open 
collaborative innovation, the knowledge exchange 
strategy in a collaboration can be either open or 
closed5, both within and outside the collaboration. 
It can furthermore be different (i.e. layered) for 
different levels of the collaboration. Accordingly, 
four possible general exchange strategies are in 
principle possible for collaborative innovation 
projects, namely: (a) open within and outside (la-
beled “public”); (b) open within and closed outside 
(labeled “private”); (c) closed within and outside; 
and (d) a layered scheme with an open exchange 
with the core members, a moderate exchange with 
the outer members and a close exchange outside 
the collaboration. Table 2 gives these strategies 
in the order from a high to a low degree of open 
exchange. The “degree of knowledge exchange” 
refers to the amount of knowledge exchange and 
thus the degree of open exchange.
The “layered exchange strategy” potentially 
has some variation of its own but for the sake of 
simplicity that is not taken into account in this 
overview. Because the other exchange strategies 
need not to consist of many partners, the ex-
pected degrees of knowledge sharing with the 
outer members are put in parentheses. The “closed 
exchange strategy” with a restrictive exchange to 
all participants indicates a much formalized and 
therefore potentially tensed collaboration. The 
“open exchange strategy” has two main forms, 
namely a public one and a private one, which 
partly relates to the private and public innovation 
model as described above (von Hippel & von 
Krogh, 2003).
CONCLUSION
This chapter presents some strategic consid-
erations with respect to managing IP in open 
collaborative innovation. It thereby shows the 
important role of IPRs and their licensing as a way 
to protect knowledge that is used and developed 
and to govern its sharing in collaborations as a 
particular form of open innovation. In particular, 
different elementary/generic licensing types are 
presented and various governance “architectures” 
are presented as certain combinations of various 
“modules” of licenses, with a particular emphasis 
on “open” innovation models (e.g. related to “open 
source” innovation). This chapter thus provides a 
typology of basic licensing schemes that can serve 
as building blocks that can be combined to form 
more complex licensing arrangements. Finally, the 
chapter more generally proposes several distinct 
strategies for governing knowledge exchange in 
open collaborative innovation, including open 
exchange and layered schemes, which thereby 
facilitate managing open innovation more suc-
cessfully.
Table 2. A typology of knowledge exchange strategies in open collaborative innovation 
Knowledge exchange strategies
Degree of knowledge exchange
Internal –
Core members
Internal –
Outer members
External –
Outside
Open exchange strategy - public High (High) High
Open exchange strategy - private High (High) Low
Layered exchange strategy High Moderate Low
Closed exchange strategy Low (Low) Low
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS6
Blanket License: A license agreement in which 
the licensor grants permission to the licensee to 
use any rights related to a particular area of future 
developments of the licensed technology.
Collaborative Innovation (Process): An 
innovation (process) involving several human 
individuals as creators. A collaboration is either 
intra- or inter-organizational (i.e. open) depending 
on whether the (individual) creators belong to the 
same or different organization(s), respectively.
Cross-License: The mutual exchange of 
licenses between two or more parties (as both 
licensor and licensee).
Grant-Back License: A license in which the 
licensor obtains the right, from the licensee, to 
improvement made by the licensee.
Information Paradox: The inherent problem 
that information or know-how cannot be described 
by its prospective seller without effective transfer 
when disclosed for inspection of a prospective 
buyer.
Innovation: Anything new (to all) and useful 
to some (short hand definition).
Intellectual Property (IP): An intangible 
property or asset that results from the creation of 
the human mind, including inventions and designs 
as well as literary or artistic works.
Intellectual Property Right (IPR): A legal 
instrument that protects certain creations of the 
human mind, including patent rights, trade secret 
rights, trademark rights, copyrights, design rights, 
database rights, and a few more specific ones.
Invention: Any human creation new to all and 
potentially useful to some.
Joint License: A license agreement in which 
two or more parties jointly offer permission to use 
a particular part of their (often complementary) 
IP to a third party, possibly involving an external 
administrator that acts as coordinator.
License: A permission granted by the owner of 
an IPR (the licensor) to another legal entity (the 
licensee) to use underlying IP in a particular way 
and under certain restrictive conditions.
Open Collaborative Innovation: Inter-
organizational collaborative innovation.
Packet/Block License: A bundle of licenses 
offered by a licensor to a licensee, in contrast to 
licenses to individual pieces of IPRs.
Patent Pool: A contractual arrangement be-
tween two or more parties to cross-license parts 
of their current or future patent portfolios related 
to certain technologies to one another or to third 
parties.
Patent Thicket: A set of closely related and 
possibly overlapping patent rights to a certain 
technology, thereby requiring anyone that wish 
to use, build on or commercialize that technology 
to obtain licenses from various patent holders.
Sub-License: A license in which the licensor 
permits the licensee to license the underlying IP 
to another licensee.
Technology: Technical knowledge or know-
how.
ENDNOTES
1  Shapiro (2001) defines a patent thicket as 
an overlapping set of patent rights requiring 
that those seeking to commercialize new 
technology obtain licenses from multiple 
patentees.
2  The basic requirements for patentability 
are novelty, inventive step and industrial 
application (see e.g. Bainbridge, 2002 for a 
more detailed elaboration).
3  An example of such more complex arrange-
ment is the GNU General Public License 
that intends to guarantee one’s freedom to 
share and change free software by obliging 
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the transfer of the source code and all the 
right to use and modify the software (the 
source code in particular).
4  Agere, Ericsson, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, 
Motorola, Nokia and Toshiba.
5  In practice, beyond the open/closed dichot-
omy, degrees of openness are also possible 
(cf. Granstrand & Sjölander, 1990; Laursen 
& Salter, 2006).
6  Some definitions are derived from Grans-
trand (2000, 2011).
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